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[A} study of cultural politics is a study of the politics ofrhe production of cultural 
explanations that are used in the academy. outside the academy, in global 
politics, in metropolitan politics, in national politics of various kinds, migrant 
politics of various kinds, articulations of majority and minority, domination/ 
exploitation. a very wide field of managing various kinds of crises that are coming 
· up in order to give people who act within these crises a certain way of describing 
what the position is. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak' 
The Haratin people of North Africa, are subjects in crisis, they are people whose origins 
are debated, and whose social status is scorned. As an indigenous population in the midst of 
regional turmoil, they have been subject to removal, forced labor, and economic deprivation. 
Their exploitation by both French colonial forces and other indigenous populations has displaced 
the Haratin way oflife and has subsumed their legal culture. This paper explores the difficulties 
of identifying indigenous legal systems where a population has been deprived of their land base 
and has been subjected to the legal system of outsiders - who are also indigenous. In this 
marginal space, benvixt the layers of oppressors, colonizers, and simultaneously other colonized 
and oppressed, I attempt to shed light upon the emerging Haratin legal system. Rather than 
focusing on the most visible aspects of a legal system that traditionally privileges fonnal 
institutions and structures, this paper examines the Haratin legal system at a very local level, 
privileging instead, informality, and common customs or practices found in everyday living that 
dictates manners and ethics, the foundation of any legal system. 
Although the Haratin live throughout North Africa, this paper focuses specifically upon 
the Haratin of the Tafilalt Oasis region of southern Morocco. Section one is devoted to the social 
history of the Haratin in order to 'locate' their position in modern Moroccan society. In 
particular, this section examines the multi-dimensional aspects of their identity, including the 
1 PhjJip Sipiora & Janet Atwill, Rhetoric and Culrurnl ExplanaJion: A Discussion with Gaya1ri Clwkravorry Spivak, 
I 0.2 JAC 1990, nvnilnble nrhttp://www.16bc:avergroup.org/mtarchivl'/archives/0002R4print.ht.ml. 
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process of naming, and the exclusion of their indigenous identity by the majority of Moroccans. 
This section also scrutinizes the affect of race and class on the formation of Haratin identity. 
Section II discusses the Ait 'Atta Berber tribe's customary law and their political relationship 
with the local Arab Shurfas. Particular attention is paid to land tenure laws of the Berber tribes 
from pre-French Protectorate, through occupation, to post-colonial state. An examination of 
'Atta governance focuses on pre-protectorate through 1956, the seminal year in Moroccan 
history that ended the formal protectorate relationship with France. Section III focuses on the 
Haratin formation and expression of their internal customary law. [ attempt to identify a space 
where Haratin people create their own laws and customs outside the reaches of the dominant 
Berber and Arab populations. Land regulation and production, labor management, and 
ecological knowledge are discussed. Section N concludes with a reflection on theories and 
lenses of analysis presented and their meaning in writing as an outsider about internal law. 
I. Haratin Identity 
A. On Naming and Meaning 
Haratin identity, forged largely by empowered outsiders, revolves primarily around 
stereotypes stemming from racial, ethnic, and class prejudices. Perhaps the most controversial of 
the many meanings and identities that the Haratin invoke is that of indigenous peoples. In a 
place where Berber tribes dominate the Moroccan image of tribal peoples, the Haratin history 
and sedentary way of life seems contradictory to an indigenous identity. While peeling away the 
layers of meaning that comprise Haratin identity, the core position of this paper firmly 
recognizes that they are indeed indigenous, and moves to examine then, the consequences of 
such labels for these members of rural Moroccan communities. 
Jn the southern oasis region of Morocco, the Haratin are a distinct caste at the bottom of a 
social hierarchy composed of landowning Arab religious specialists known as Shur/a, 
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transhumant indigenous popu lations, specifically the Ait  'Atta Berber tribe, and s lave 
descendents known as the Ismkhan. 2 The Haratin people are subj ect to discrimination by these 
other groups, in particular because of their perceived lack of clear origins and ambiguous racial 
ident ity. This discrimination manifests i tself for instance, in the name Haratin ,  the etymology of  
which is debated by scho lars. Some scho lars have adopted the opinion that Haratin i s  an Arabic 
tenn3 while others insi st that the word is more than likely Berber in origin .  Prof. Chouki El 
Hamel notes that the Berber word ahardan, meaning 'dark color' ,  is the earl iest known use of the 
tenn, dat ing back to the thirteenth century, and that its use in  some regions of Morocco to 
designate dark skinned persons is contrasted with the word for white skinned persons -
Amazigh, 4 that is a lso the word one group of  Berber people use to self-identify. He also found 
instances of Arab-speaking persons using the term to mean 'ens laved blacks '  and historically i n  
Mauritania to  refer to freed b lack slaves.5 
The term Haratin is sim i larly used to designate a specific group o f  dark-skinned 
agricu l tural ists and peasants.6 There are few and scanty references to the Harat in  in the li terature 
of Morocco ,  and where they are mentioned, it i s usual l y  on ly  in thei r relation as laborers for the 
Ait  'Atta Berber tribe ,  a popu lar focus of ethnographers and anthropo logi sts. The Haratin ' s  
l REMCO ENSEL, SA INTS ANO S ERVANTS IN SOUTH ERN MOROCCO 3 ( 1 999) .  Ensel wrote this book as a rev ision to 
his Ph .D .  at the University of Amsterdam. H is primary base of research was in the Draa River Val ley of Morocco, 
with special focus on the Haratine peoples, conducted from 1 993�94 . 
3 Hsain l lahiane, The Power of the Dagger. the Seeds of the Korao. and the Sweat of the P loughman: Ethnic 
Slratification and Agricultural Intensification i n  the Ziz Valley, Southeast Morocco J 07 n .7 ( 1 998)  (unpublished 
dissertation, University of Arizona) (on file with the Univers i ty of New Mexico Law Library). No r ing that the word 
has roots in the Arabic verb haratha, to planl, and a lso hor thani, meani ng free people .  I lahiane is currently 
teaching at the University of Iowa and is revising rus Ph.D . for publ ication. J lahiane is from Morocco and based his 
research primarily in the state of Errachid ia , which encompasses the Ta fila l t  oasis region. His acknowledgements 
inc lude ' A m.id Chad who taught l labiane about l ocal  Moroccan and French history (of  the oasis) from a Harat in  
point of view. 
' Chou\o El Hame l ,  'Race '. Slavery and Islam in the Maghribi Mediterranean Thought: 111e Question of the Hnratin 
i11 Morocco, TH E JOURNAL OF NORTH A FRICAN STUD IES,  Vol.7, N o. 3  at 29 ,  3 8  (Autu mn 2002) . Prof. El Hamel 
wrote this artic le duri ng his te nure al the Schomburg Ce nter for Research in Black Cu lture in New York City.  He is  
current ly a professor of Is lamic history at Arizona State U niversity. 
s Id. at 39.  
6 ENSEL supra no1e 2 .  at 3 .  
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marginality is figuratively emphasized when they are mentioned in brief passages or footnotes. 
For instance, in a book about Arabs and Berbers in Morocco, a col_lection of several authors, the 
Haratin are described as follows: 
The origin of the haratin class is sti l l  a subject of debate, but they are 
generally bel i eved to be the descendents of black, immigrant slaves who 
intermarried with the Berber population .  Most had dark skin and negroid 
features . . .  almost all of them worked as khammas laborers for the white 
Arabs or Berbers, receiving for their toil a fifth or less o f the harvests. ''7 
In another work, an author notes in a parenthetical reference that "it i s  axiomatic that in  Morocco 
before 1 9 1 2  'rural ' and 'tribal' were one and the same, except for the negroid cu l tivators, known 
as Haratin, i n  the Saharan oases who are probably not tribally organized .',a The same author 
reconfirms the agriculture identity of the Haratin, de-emphasizing their indigenous quality: "The 
Haratin . . . are a very old, negroid and non-tribal population . . .  [t]hey are sedentary 
agriculturalists, well-diggers and date cultivators, and they are perhaps the most numerous single 
element o f  the population in the Moroccan Deep South. "9 Despite their majority, they remain 
marginal ized in majoritarian politics and texts . 
The reference of  Haratin identity in  connection w ith labor, i n  part icu l ar agriculture, i s  a 
product of  both a colonia l past, as well as one of subjugation of the Haratin and thei r lands by 
other indigenous groups . The obfuscation of the h istory of slavery practiced by indigenous tribes 
in Morocco simultaneously dis/locates the Haratin people in the popular national imagination . 
Dominant groups , who live among the Harat in ,  have succeeded in  displacing the Haratin ' s  
origins outside of  Morocco based on  race, thus ' un-ind igenizing '  them from the region .  This 
1 Ross E. Dunn, Berber Imperialism: the A il A lla Expansion in Southeast Morocco . in ARABS AND BERBERS,  FROM 
TRlBE TO NATION IN NORTH AFRICA 95 (Ernest Gel lner & Charles Micaud eds . ,  1 972). The editors of the book 
compiled various works on North Africa to explore the "significance of ethnicity in the process of na t ionbuilding 
[sic] and modernization in North Africa," and was made possible with help from the Cen1er for In ternationa l Race 
Relat ions. Id. at  I .  
a David Hart, The Tribe i11 Modern Morocco: two case studies. in ARABS AND BERBERS, supra note 7 ,  at 53 
'herei.nafler Hart. Tribe in Modern Morocco] . 
Id. 
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prejudiced perception of the Haratin ' s  origins is passed on to European ethnographers and 
anthropologists, and later expressed in academic l i terature about Morocco. 
The references to s lavery further compl icate an understanding of Haratin ident i ty. The 
silence surrounding slavery practiced by Muslims throughout North Africa and Europe during 
the height of the Islanuc conquest of  the Mediterranean makes i t  more difficult to explore fully 
exactly why the Haratin are assoc iated with descendants of freed Sudanese s laves. Thi s  si lence -
"the refusal to engage in discussions on s lavery and racial attitudes" in Is lam, "reflects an 
embarrassment felt col lect ively throughout the centuries ."  1 0  During the decl ine of the Is lamic 
empire in nonhern Europe, the slave trade moved to sub-Saharan Africa. This was problematic 
as this region had long been conquered by Islam and the rel igious status of the people as 
Musl ims was overlooked or ignored as a bar to their enslavement according to Islamic law. 1 1 
Several thousands o f  these slaves poured out of  the Sudan region from Morocco and were 
exported throughout North Africa. 1 2 In Morocco, the patterns of slavery were varied according 
to the needs of purchasers in cities versus rural areas. In urban dwellings ,  slaves were 
predominately women who performed domest ic  services or were concubi nes to the wealthy, 
wh i le rural s laves in the oasis were predom.inatel y male ,  and worked in  agriculture . 1 3  When 
these s l aves were manumitted , their status altered the working relationsh ip between the former 
s lave owning fami ly and the freed s lave, often result ing in another type of c l ient rel at i onship .  
There is an important d ist inction however, between the Haratin and freed s laves, for "the haratin 
10 El Hamel, supra note 4, at 29 . 
1 1  Id. at 37. El Hame l cites a letter from the people ofTuwat in present-day Algeria to a scho lar in Timbuktu 
requesting h.is opinion about the enslavement of free black African Muslims, to which he responded was an unlawful 
act and the burden of proof to the contrary (that t he person was 'e l igible ' for enslavement) rested with those who 
bought and sold the slaves. 1 2 John Wright, Morocco: The I.Ast Great Slave Market? ,  JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES, Vol .  7, No. 3 at 
53, 5 5  (Autumn 2002 ) . . 1 > Cynthia Becker. 'We are Real Slaves. Real lsmkhnn ·: Memories of the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade in the Tafilaler 
o/S011tli -£as1ern Morocco, JOURNAL OF NORTII A PR ICAN STUDIES, Vol .  7. No. 4 at 97 ,  98 (Winter 2002). 
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were not freed slaves . . .  rather, they were free from the beginning." 1 4 Prof. El Hamel supports 
the not ion that the Haratin were indigenous to the Dra Valley since t ime immemorial, with 
evidence from oral trad i tions of the Tata region, and the history of invading Berber tribes from 
northern Morocco and eastern North Africa into the oasis where they dominated Haratin lands, 
assuming the ro le of landowner over the local Haratin . 1 5  There remains some dispute about the 
historical status of Haratin as sl aves, nonetheless, it is part of their identity. 
An important di fference between the Haratin laborers and descendants of freed slaves i s  
that of social incorporat ion and mobility afforded to  manumitted slaves. Whereas freed slaves 
were considered freed people with rights, the Haratin toiled as laborers and did not have the 
opportunity to mobi l ize their social status through manumission. The Harat in were subj ect to the 
Berber by conquest of their lands, thereafter they engaged in an economic relationship with the 
Berbers that amounted to indentured servitude and peonage. This unregulated, uni latera l 
relationship, created through oppressive circumstances, and pract ical ly inescapable was the 
source of a new traj ectory in Haratin history that led to the widespread d ispossess ion of thei r 
land. 
In modem times, i t  is generally undisputed that  the word Harat in  i tsel f a l so remains a 
pejorative term. 1 6  The Haratin  use several al ternative terms then to sel f-identi fy. For instance, in 
the Draa Valley, they prefer the term dar-i, (plural dar ·awi) meaning nat ives of the Draa 
Val ley. 1 7 Other Haratin choose to take the name o f  the place they li ve, such as t he Ait Ora, Ai t  
Tidgha, and Ait Dads, 1 8  adopting the Berber des ignator "Ait" ,  meaning ' people of. • 1 9  Using the 
1 4 El Hamel , supra note 4, at 39. 
I S  Jd. 
1 6  ENSEL, supra note 2 ,  a t  2 .  
1 7  MOHAMMED ENNAJ I , SERVTNG THE MASTER: SLAVERY AND SOCI ETY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY MOROCCO 62 
(Seth Graebner, trans. ,  St .  Manin's Press 1 998) ( 1 994) .  "They c l a im precedence as the  va l ley 's fi�t inhabitanlS and 
say that the whi tes, origina l ly nomads, c.1me later 10 abuse rbe i r  hospi ta l i ty and treat them as s l a ves ."  ltl. 
" Han ,  Tribe i11 Modem Morocco, supra note 8. at 5) .  
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Berber form of  social identification serves as an act of resistance to the outside designation of 
what and who the Haratin are perceived to be: outsiders, non-tribal, and without origin .  
B. Conceptualizing Ind igenous Identity 
The debate surrounding the origins of the Haratin and thei r status as indigenous peoples 
i s  clouded by their tradi t ional occupation as agricultural laborers for Berber land owners whose 
traditional tribal way of li fe dominates the Moroccan imagination of who tribal or indigenous 
people are . Locating the Haratin peoples in an indigenous versus tribal context i l l uminates the 
d ifficult ies of international and cross-cultural "indigenous/tribal literacy''.20 Exp loring this 
aspect of  Haratin identity interrogates tradi t ional models of understanding tribes as independent, 
isolated communities thus, highlighting the interdependency of indigenous groups like the local 
Berber tribes upon the Haratin . I emphasize the tenn indigenous and privi lege i ts use as "[i ] t  has 
also been an umbrel la enabl ing communi t ies and peoples to come together, transcending their 
own colon ized contexts and experiences, in order to learn. share, plan, organize and struggle 
col lectively for sel f-determinat ion on the global and local stages. "2 1 
The Haratin fall squarely within the spectrum of  the triba l  - indigenous - ethnic minority 
debate . The l abel s are important because they each determine recognized individual and/or 
1
� ERNEST GELLNER. SAINTS OF THE ATLAS 36  ( 1 969). "The affi liat ion of a Berber to a social group is generally 
expressed in terms of bis alleged patri l ineal descent . . .  [s]oc ial groups in Berber society general ly have the name 
Ait X .  X is usua l ly, but nor a lways. the name of a person, such as Brahim or Mhand . . . 'A i t '  cao however a lso be 
combined with a place name, to designate the inhabitants of tbe place: for instance, Ait Tal.mest, the people of  
Talmest ." Id.  Gellner is considered an eminent Is lamic scholar and Moroccan spec ial is t  based out o f  London. He 
was an anthropologist in Morocco and focused especia lly  on the segmentary system o f  social organizat ion among 
the Atlas Berbers . His work in this area however, has been disputed by other scholars .  See Henry Munson Jr, 
Segmentation : Reality or Myth? ,  1 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICA L INSTITUTE 829 ( 1 995). 
20 Christine Zuni Cruz & Margaret E. A l arid Montoya , A Narrative Braid Examin ing Racial Literacy 6 (Dec. 2003) 
(unpubl ished paper, on file with the authors at the U. of New Mexico SOL) .  I use the term 'tribal l i teracy ' as an 
adaptat ion o f  Margaret Montoya ' s theory of racial l i teracy to convey how we ' read · tribal and indigenous identi ty. 
2 1 LINDA TUHlWA I SM ITH , DECOLONIZfNG METHODOLOG IES RESEARCH AND lND IGENOlJS P EOPLES 7 (5th ed. ,  2002) .  
Tuh.iwai Smi t h  is an  Associate Pro fessor in Educat ion and Director of the I nternationa l Research lnst itute for Maori 
and Indigenous Education at the Univers ity of Auckland, New Zealand. She theorizes de-co lonial stTategies for 
res�arch on indigenous peoples using her own background as a Maori and her educational background in European 
epistemology. 
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collective human rights. Moreover, considering the Haratin against these labels will interrogate 
and destabi lize their traditional meanings. 
Although a strong emphasis is made on historical chronology of human migration in 
order to d ifferent iate between tribal and indigenous peoples, "it is  a type of unjust social 
relationship . . .  that creates the ' indigenousness ' that many now seek to protect via an 
international regime. "22 It is the condi tion of indigenous and tribal peoples as exploited , 
polit ically and cultural ly  dominated and subj ected that is at the heart of the term indigenous.23  
This understanding of tribal/indigenous peoples was largely conceived at the international forum 
of the United Nations (U.N.) .  Although the U.N. created the Working Group on Indigenous 
Popu 1ations (WGIP), it has not formally defined the terrn indigenous. 24 However, one useful and 
comprehensive definition was offered by Jose R.  Martinez Cobo, a Spe.cial Rapporteur appointed 
in 1 97 1  by the WGIP: 
Indigenous communities ,  peoples and nations are those which, having a 
h i storical continui ty with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societ i es that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves disti nct from other 
sectors of societies now prevailing in those t erritories or parts of them .  
They form a t  present non-dominant sectors o f  soc iety an d  are determ ined 
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generat ions their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued 
existence as peoples, in accordance with thei r own cu l tural patterns, social 
insti tut ions and legal systems. 25 (emphasis added) 
Simi larly, the U.N.  has dealt w i th minorit ies, although in the context  o f  European ethnic  
stri fe .  The U.N.  defi nes a m inority group as one "dominated in fact as wel l  as in  numbers, and 
that exhibi ts a di stinct i dentity, which it wishes to preserve, implicitly or otherwise. ' '26 However, 
the U .N .  's Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to a National or Ethnic, Religious 
Z? MA IVAN CLECH LAM , AT THE EDGE OF TH E ST Ale : IN DIG ENOUS PEOPLES AND S ELF-DETE RM I N ATION 3 (2000). 
2J Id. at 3 - 4 .  
14 Id .  al 6 . . 
2.1 Id. a t  7 .  
26 Id. at 5-6.  
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and Linguistic Minorities, did not attempt to guarantee any rights to territory. 27 Minority groups 
are distinguished from indigenous peoples on the basis of their anachmenno a specific territory, 
and further, their insistence on the reproduct ion of their communiti es . 28 Where minority groups 
tend to integrate or assimilate into a dominant society, reproduction of their cu lture tends not to 
be as marked as it is  with indigenous peoples since their assurance of that reproduction is in thei r 
place of  origin. 29 
Fitting the Haratin into th i s  classi fication scheme requires a reconsideration of these 
definitions .  The U.N. and Cobo ' s  definition of indigenous peoples assumes a sense of autonomy 
or agency of the nat ive group whose territory i s under their control (or at least once was) . 
Further, the definitions underscore a col lective consciousness as d istinct peoples with a clear 
historical or mythical origin that develops a cohesive group identity. The definit ion of minority 
groups has a s imi Jar underlying assumption, but places the origins of these groups in  a 
recogni zable 'place' that is under the control of  that particu lar group, empowered to reproduce 
cu l ture there as opposed to the site of their relocat ion . 
The Haratin ' s  s ituation seems to col lapse these defini t i ons . Whi le  the Haratin origi ns are 
perceived to be 'unclear'  they are connected to the Tafila l t  oasis in  southern Morocco through 
centuries of agricultural labor. And although the oasis region has tradit ional ly  not been under 
Haratin pol itical  control , it has been cul t ivated by them., making their connection to this area 
more rea l than mere political domination . Prejud ice keeps the Haratin segregated and 
unassimilated unlike how other m inority groups tend to ass im i late and integrate. Because there 
is no assurance of reproduction in thei r  place of origin, the Harat in  must maintain their 
connection to their  dist i nct culture. U l timate ly, the Harat i n  retain many features of  an 
2
; LAM .  supra note 22 ,  at 6. 
21 Id. at 9. 
29 Id. 
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i ndigenous population who display "significant hi storical attachment to territory, ' '  speci fically 
the oasis region, maintain a "commitment to culture distinctiveness_," and are beginning to 
preserve their "territory and culture as a means of reproducing a singular ethnic community. "30 
In an attempt to deploy a di scourse of indigenism that incorporates the historical experiences of 
the Haratin - an economical ly exploited class, racially d iscriminated against, and landless, the 
tenns used to l abel them must be modi fied to include a variety of experiences of subj ugation and 
d ifferentiat ion . 3 1  
Without a doubt, the Haratin ' s  historical occupation of the oasis region in  southern 
Morocco, along with their social i solation in their respective communities, and thei r own 
assertion of  autonomy, al l  support the conclusion that the Haratin are an indigenous group . 
Although not tribally organized l ike the local Berber tribes who maintain intricate kinship ti es, 
they do maintain a signi ficant relationship with a speci fic  territory, and even as urban minorit ies 
in  northern Moroccan cities, thei r connect ion to thei r homeland is reinforced by migration 
patterns that usual ly  end back at thei r homelands in southern Morocco. 
C. Qsar Liv ing and the Creation of Castes 
Unlike their Berber counterparts, Haratin peoples are not tribal ly  organized . Rather, they 
form "smal l pockets of  endogamous population groups , even i solated fami l ies or ind iv iduals . . . " 
and "[o )ut  of necessity they live as dependants in the proximity of other populat ion groups ."32 
Thi s  social organization results from the history of oasis l iv ing in adobe walled settlements 
JO  Id. 
J i  Id. at 1 1 . · ·1n the fina l  ana lysjs, the categories " indigenous·· . "triba l " ' ,  and "minori ty", l ike their referents, are nol 
iron-clad but overl ap, and sometimes even merge, when the condit ions that their members experience converge:· 
Id. 
'
2 ENSEL. st1pra nole 2 ,  al 3 .  
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called qsar-s . 33 These v i llage-t'ype dwellings provided autonomous agricultural outposts dott ing 
the oasis l andscape and were dominated in the l 7th and l 8 th centuries by the Arab Shur fa and 
Murabitin, and then in the 1 9 th century by the encroaching A.it ' Atta tribe. 34 In this contex t of 
shi fting pol i t ical power, the .fragmentation of the Haratin across the oases region is a natural 
consequence .  35 
S ince the invasion of  their lands, the Haratin have been constrained to a low status as 
sharecroppers by the Arab and Berber nobility through their monopoly of land ownership and 
l egal restrictions on al i enat ion of  such property, as well as thei r ethnic/racial discrimination 
against the Harat in . 36 The Haratin ' s  incorporation into the qsar economy as laborers was 
exasperated when the Ait  ' Atta Berber tribe pushed into the Tafilalt oasis and the Draa Valley, 
competing with other tribes for valuable access to water and pasture lands. The Ait 'Atta entered 
a ra 'aya or protection relationship with the Haratin and Arabs, promising protect ion from other 
raiding tribes in exchange for a large portion of the harvest , water, and grazing lands .37 This 
relationship established terms of  conquest, and the people of  the qsar were not al lowed to retain 
their property rights . In fact , the ' Ana invaded many qsar-s and seized their palm groves , 
gardens, and grain fields, leaving the local populat ion landless . The Haratin in many qsar-s were 
left to do the fieldwork for the new ' A tta lords - as they abhorred sedentary act ivity, and in 
exchange the Harat in received a portion of the harvest rather than wages. 38 Individual Haratin 
fami l ies often moved with thei r landowners and l ived among them as workers . Thi s  semi ­
contractual  relationship was formalized in  a ritual cal l ed dabiha , where a Hartani wou ld sacri fice 
ll l lah.iane. supra note 3 ,  al 1 1 2 .  
3 4  Id. a t  94 . 
" TUH IWA I  SM ITH , supra note 2 1 ,  at 28. 
l<> Hsain J l ah.iane, Globnlization ;s a Good Thing: "French Colonial Opportunities " and the Rise of the Horatine in 
Morocco, 1 2  TRANSNAT ' L  L. & CONTEMP.  PROSS. 1 1 2 ( 2002 ) (he reinafter l l ah iane. Globalization ] .  
1 6  I lahianc, supra note 3 ,  a t  95.  
n Dunn, supra note 7, a t  93 .  
JS ld. at 96 .  
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a sheep to the landowning fami ly. 39 The Haratin became dependent on the land owning c l ass for 
their survival and protect ion, constituting a large reserve of m igrat ing marginal peasants in 
search of work, a subst itution for land, which would ensure them securit y. 40 
Similarly, the Shurfa and Mrabitin were also subj ect to ' Atta rule  and lost their pol i tica l 
control of the oasis estab l ished during the 1 7m and l 8 th  centuries. Di fferent from the Harat in 
however, these Arab populations maintained a position of power. The Shurfa in the Ta filal t  
oasis region, are thought to be descendents o f  th e  Prophet Muhammad via the } jneage of  the 
foW1ding Arab dynasties in  Morocco.4 1  Th.is lineage affords them many priv i leges but more 
important, it is the main reason for their revered socia l  status. The Murabit in are sel f-proclaimed 
descendants of local saints or holy men and are responsible for the care and upkeep of the 
Zawiya or shrine of their ancestor, as well as the di stribution of gj fts of money or other goods 
donated by the saint ' s  followers . 42 These two dominating sedentary popu lat ions of the Moroccan 
oasis are revered not on ly for thei r re l igiosity, but also for thei r possession of baraka, or d iv ine  
blessing that enabled these groups to serve as in tenned iaries and arb i t rators for l oca l tribal 
d i sputes among the various sub-tribes of the Ait • At ta, a major Berber tribal  confederat ion . 43 
Like the Haratine, they a lso established qsar-s, pri marily began as religious sanctuaries and 
lodges that over t i me, became centers of stabi l ity and safety whi l e  tribes batt led one another for 
control of grazing territory in the region . 
The Berber tribe 's  pol i t ical dominance and mi l i tary power enabled them to mainta in a 
high status and posi t ion of dominance over the local  populat ions of Shur fa, Murabitin and 
}
9 Id. at 96 .  
40 Ensel , supra note 2, at 1 48 and 8 1 .  
4 1  l l ahiane, supra note 3 , a t  I 08 .  
4
2 Id. 
43 GELLNER, s11pra note 1 9, at 75 .  
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Haratin . 44 The Shurfa and the Murabi tin meanwhile, maintained their elite status by continuing 
thei r  relationship with the encroaching Berber tribes as peace�brokers45 - a position they held 
since the early  seventeenth century.46 Without land or religious prestige, the Haratin were 
relegated to the bottom of the oasis social hierarchy and thei r role  as laborers for ali en 
landowners drove them deeper into debt, poverty, and ultimately poli tical disernpowerment . 
D. Indigenous and Tribal minorities in  Conflict 
The subjection of the Haratin by another ind igenous group unmasks the previously noted 
contentions between Haratin, Berbers, and Arabs, especially in terms of the dominant perception 
of Haratin as "outsiders" despite recognition of the fact that they are perhaps the oldest 
indigenous group in southern Morocco.47 The di fficulty of understanding this practice of one 
coloni zed group subordinating another is however, a "pivot point"48 where identity and racial 
privilege come to the surface. 49 Indeed this situation inverts the commonly noted shared 
experience of  indigenous peop les as "peoples who have been subjected to the colonization of 
their lands and cultures, and the denial of  the ir  sovereignty, by a colonizing soc iety that has come 
44 Ilahiane, Globalization , supra note 36 ,  at I 09, 1 1 2 . 
,s llabiane ,  supra note 3, at 95 .  
46 Id. at  94 . 
47 Hart. Tribe in Modern Morocco, supra note 8, at 53 .  
48 Zuni Cruz & Montoya, supra note 20, at  3 .  Profs. Margaret Montoya & Christ ine Zuni-Cruz, presented their dra ft 
before srudents at Univ. of New Mexico SOL, November 4, 2003. The presentation by these two professors 
foUowed that of the New Mexico State Historian, Ernesto Rael -Ga l vez explor ing indigenous s lavery and  peonage m 
New Mexico by the Spanish and Mestizo co lonizers . Their presentat ion e xplored elements o f  race and inter-rac ial 
communication and l ite racy. M ontoya 's research is based pri mari ly in  Critical  Race Theory; Zuni-Cruz '  scholarship 
is focused on Federal Indian La w and internal tribal  customary l aw. 
•
9 The subord ination of one indigenous group by another is not unique to the Berber o f  Morocco, but is documented 
by other indigenous groups such as the l nka of South America. See Nathan Wachtel, The Mitimas of the 
Cochabamba Valley: The Colonization Policy of Huuyana Capac, THE INCA AND AZTEC STATES 1 400- 1 800 ( 1 982) ,  
and also John H .  Rowe, The Mitimas of the Cochabamba Valley: The Colonization Policy of H11ayana Capac, THE 
INCA AND A ZTff STA TES 1 400- 1 800 ( 1 980). 
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to dominate and determine the shape and qual i ty of thei r l ives, even after it has formal ly  pu l led 
out,'' implying colonization by a Western co lonial force . 50 
Besides po litical power, the racial privi lege of the local Berber and Arab populations lent 
them prest ige in both their eyes as wel l as the French during their occupation of Morocco in the 
early 1 900 's. Their status as 'white '  populations distinguished them from the Harat in whose 
skin co lor alone gave away the history of slavery, peonage, and ancient migrat ion .  This 
obscured past devoid of recognizable ancestors i s  contrasted with the Ait 'Atta pride in their 
genealogical social organization based on their legendary ancestor Oadda 'Atta. The 
combination of racial privi lege and mi l itary dominance created agency among the Ait ' Atta to 
choose and negot iate their own identity as wel l as dictate the identi ty of those they dominated, 
l ike the Haratin .  The implications of choosing one ' s  identity are certain ly not without its 
"resource consequences. "5 1 The Ai t ' Atta div ided land and water among their l ineages whi le 
displacing the rights of the sedentary groups they conquered , adhering to their organizational 
princip le of exclud ing strangers or non-members from these benefits . 52 The historical 
discrimination against the Haratin hindered their  progress towards sel f-detennination. 53 Only 
recent ly  due to market changes and rural-urban migrat ions, as well as changes in government 
have the Haratin been gjven access to property ownership ,  sl owly commencing a process of self­
determ.ination . 
The law in the southern oasis communiti es is a law in  flux . The po l i t i ca l  dynamics of the 
region st i l l  dictate the contours of relationships a long racial l i nes whi le the Moroccan state has 
so TUHIWAI SM ITH, supra note 2 1 ,  a t 7. 
5 1  Montoya & Zuni-Cruz, supra note 20 .
.ll DAVID HART, 0ADDA ' A  TIA AND H IS FORTY GRANDSONS :  THE SOCIO-POL ITICAL ORGANISATION OF THE Arr 
. A TT A OF SOUTHERN MOROCCO I 05 ( 1 98 1 )  [hereinafter HART, DADDA 'A  TT A] .  Hart i s  considered the leadi ng 
scholar of Berber socio-polit ical history and cu lrure .  Primarily an thropologist , now professor in London, Han 
p,erfonned most o f  h is research between 1 960-65 among the Ait Atta . 
. l Montoya & Zun i -Cruz. supra no1e 20. 
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made strides in guaranteeing rights for al l  Moroccans. The fading customary trad i t ions of the Ait  
' Atta in the qsar-s, and the shrinking eminence of  the local Arab rel igious fami l ies are met with 
strategies of Hara t in fami l ies and individuals, carving out a new direct ion for their futures by  
migrating to cit ies for work, send ing their remi ttances home where fami ly are now able to 
purchase property. Despite the lack of  political power in their communities, the Harat in  are not 
ent irely powerless . 5-4 They are ab le to negotiate and manipulate ex ist ing power structures -
slowly subverting their historical hierarchical oppression. 
U. Tribal Profile 
A. Colon ial Power and the Implementation of 'Atta Ru le 
With the Ait 'Atta retaining control of  the qsar-s by the end of the 1 9th century, the 
imp lementation of  their  customary laws was inevitable. Faci l itating ' Atta polit i cal dominance 
was the j udicia l  empowerment given to tribal governments by the French during their brief 
co loni al  occupat ion of Morocco from 1 9 1 2- 1 956, known as the protectorate era. Morocco was 
a l ready under co lon ia l  rule by the Spanish in  the south, but the interi or remained largely 
untouched. 55 The Moroccan su ltan "ruled over a soc iety dominated by  triba l i sm in  which, . . .  
powerful Arab or Berber ch ieftains success fu l l y  cha l lenged the authority o f  the central 
government (the maklzzen) . "56 The French a long the Algerian border exploi ted the vulnerabi l i ty 
of the central government .  Lou is -Hubert Lyautey, a French o fficer posted in  A lgeria, set up 
trad ing posts wi th tribesmen along the border and began an economic penetrat ion of  Morocco, a 
S4 M ICHEL FOUCAU LT, THE H ISTORY OF SEXUA LITY AN INTRODUCTION, VOL. l ,  92-93 (Robert Hurley. trans. ,  
Viaatge Books, 1 990) ( 1 978) .  " [P]ower must be Ullderstood in the firs t  instance as the  mul t ipl ic i ty o f  force re lations 
i mmanent  in the sphere in which they operate and which constirutc the i r own organization . . .  [and) as the srra1egies in 
whic h  they !Ake effect whose genera l design or insrirutional crystal liz.ation is embodied in the sU!te apparatus, in the 
formu lation of law, in the various socia l  hegemonies . . .  [p ]ower is everywhere ; not because i l  embraces everything, 
but be<:ause i t  comes from everywhere." Id. 
ss W I LLIAM A. HOIS INGTON. J R . , LYAUTEY AND Tl-I E F RENCH CONQUEST OF MOROCCO 22 ( 1 995) .  Hoisington i s  
current ly a h i s tory professor at the  Univers i ty of I l linois  and  focuses on Moroccan h istory. 
56 Id. 
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strategy to faci l itat e paci fication of  the tribal Moroccan interior through a governing system of  
indirect rule  that privi leged Berber authority. 57 
Lyautey' s ideas were soon implemented in order to deal with the ' native quest ion '  on the  
interior of  Morocco . 58 The strategy was to  emp loy anny ethnographers to study the  Berber tribes 
and customs and use that information to faci l i tate 'paci ficat ion ' of the tribes and incorporate their 
governing structures into the French protectorate. 59 Lyautey described this system prev ious to 
entering Morocco, whi l e  he was posted in Hanoi : 
Instead of abolishing tradi tional systems, make use of them: Rule with the 
mandarin and not against him. It fol lows that i f we are - and are always 
destined to be - a very smal l minority here, we ought not aspire to 
subst itute ourselves for the mandarins, but at best guide and oversee them. 
Therefore, offend no tradition, change no custom,  remind ourselves that i n  
al l human society there is a rul ing class, . . .  and a c lass  to  be  ruled:  Enlist 
the ru l ing class in  our service .  Once the mandarins are our fri ends, certain 
of  us and needing us, they have on ly to say the word and the country wi l l  
be  paci fied, and a t  far less cost and w i th  greater certainty than by a l l  the 
mi l i tary expeditions we could send there.60 
Lyautey's methodology demanded that officers not "upset Berber "customary law" by  
introducing either French or Musl im pract i ces ."6 1 One outcome of  this pol icy was the  exa ltation 
of the Berber i nstirution of the tribal vi l lage counci l  (ajmu), thought to be an authentic expression 
of their po l i t ica l  I i  fe and eventual ly  used as an instrument for faci litating French rule upon 
appointing representat ives.62 This same inst itut ion was recognized by the French government 
and so gave ri se to the pol i tical dominance o f  Berber tribes across rural Morocco at the expense 
of other local  communi t ies l ike the H arat in .  
51  Id. at 29. 
js Id. at 36. 
s9 Id. at 64 .  
60 Id. at 6. 
6 1  HOISINGTON, supra note 55 ,  81  72. 
62 In. 
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The French policy towards tribes emphasized differences between Arabs and Berbers, 
between urban and rural dwellers, and between shari 'a (Muslim) and customary (tribal) law.63 
This approach assumed that the two systems were incompatible and separate, overlooking the 
fact that although tribes maintained governing structures that were internal to their own customs, 
Berbers shared a common Islamic heritage with Arabs. 64 Another problem was that the French 
treated tribes as isolated pol i tical units without cons idering co-ex istence and dependence upon 
their larger super-structures, and local sedentary populations. 65 This misunderstanding produced 
by the ethnographer' s  gaze and romantic vision of Lyautey was intensi fied with the passage of 
the Berber Dahir or the Berber Decree of J 930 . The decree sought to imp lement a system of 
Berber justice, recognizing the Berber legal system.66 The reaction from Moroccans in the urban 
areas was riot and resistance . The French were accused of forcing the sultan to give up his 
authority over the Berber hinterland and the decree was received as a threat to the religious and 
poli tical unity of the sultanate. 67 The French clai med that the decree was to reinforce the Berber 
justice system in order to protect the rights of those engaged in property transact i ons and 
l i tigation. 68 The Berber Decree reflected the French perspective that the tribes shou ld be 
governed according to their own laws and customs (but administered by the French), ult imately 
pitt ing the urban Muslim governing authority against  the rural tribal  regimes .69 The French in 
effect , parceled out power among various local authorities, a system of divide and rule . 
63 Han, Tribe in Modern Morocco, supra note 8, at 26 .  
� Id. 
65 Id. at 32 .  66 WJLLIAM A. HOIS INGTON, JR . ,  T H E  CASAB LANCA CONNECTION, FRENCH COLON I A L  POLICY, 1 936- 1 943 29 
( 1 984). 
61 Id. 
i.s Id. at 30. 
69 Id. The autl,or emphasizes that the pol icy was a l igned on the ax is  of urban versus rural because there were a lso 
Arab tribes that benefited from th.is decree. 
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Mahmood Mamdani proposes that this type of  bi furcated power structure, or in the 
Moroccan case, a trini ty of powers (French civi l law, Shari 'a or Muslim jurisprudence, and 
Customary Law) creates a racial ized state power yielding a racialized civil society. 70 Accord ing 
to Mamdani, the co lonial authority's promotion of ethnic di fferent iat ion was part of their strategy 
to create al legiances to a native or tribal identity, and thereby empower nat ive inst itut ions of 
authority - using them to subject others. He asserts that 
indirect rule aimed at nothing less than to shape the preferences of the 
mass through a more organic  elite . . .  ind irect rule was a hegemonic 
enterprise . . .  native subjects were incorporated i nto the arena of colonial 
power rather than . . .  (being] excluded from it . 7 1  
Native subjects i n  Morocco were incorporated into the co lonial power via the Berber Da.hir. The 
Hara ti n  were now subjected under multip le systems of power. The institutionalization of  
customary law privi leged certain native authorities, resulting in Haratin dejure oppression by the 
local Berber nobi l ity and administratively appointed chiefs. A consequence of  imp lement ing a 
customary law system in Morocco was "to give "trad i t i on ' '  a marked ly  authoritarian context"72  
that had negat ive impl ications for a lready powerless subjects l i ke the Harat in .  
B. Traditional Law: Ait 'Atta Customary Law 
The Ait 'Atta are a Berber or /mazighen tribe in Morocco .  Trad i tiona l ly, they claim their 
origins are with their patri l ineal ancestor, Dadda ' Atta or Grandfather ' Atta who l i ved in the 
7 0  Mahmood Mamdani ,  Historicizing Power and Responses 10 Power: /11dfrect Rule and its Reform, 6 SOC IAL  
RESEARCH 859-86 (Fa l l  1 999). available a t  
hnp://firmearch .oc le .oreJimages/WSP1Jwsopdf2/PDF/04763/2OT46nS5 . PDF, 3 .  Marnd.ani is a professor at the 
Dept. of Anthropology at Co lumbia University as wel l  as the Di reccor of the Inst .  of A frican Studies at SIPA o f  
Columbia Univers i ty. He focuses on pos t-colonia l  perspectives of the  tTadiC iona l soc ial sciences. 
7 1  Id. at 4 . 
71 Id. at 7 . 
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sixteenth century and came to southeast-central Morocco. 
73 The genealogical rel ationship to the 
agnatic74 ancestor Dadda 'Atta is what gave birth to the Ait ' Ana Con federacy, the super-tribal 
organizational unit of this tribe who are then subdivided into five sub tribes, or kham khmas, the 
five fi fths.75 These tribes are then subdivided further into clans and l ineages who di spersed 
themselves throughout the oasis area, expanding the Ait ' Atta tribal authority, usurping and 
destroying qsar-s, intimidating the Haratin residents, evicting various Shurfa families and 
gaining control of  qsar li fe in the oasis . 76 Their rap id expansion that privileged tribalism and 
thei r pract ice of marginal ism has been described as a "striking example of 'Berber 
Imperial i sm.  , . .n 
For the Berbers, the area of land litigation and regulation is directly impacted by their 
conquest of  the sedentary qsar populations. Land was either acquired during conquest , 
becoming common lands for the local ' Att a c lans and lineages, or acquired by inheritance. The 
' Atta legal system that centered on property ownership establi shed economic equi l ibrium am ong 
tribal members and dis-equilibrium for non-members , thus, maintaining a system of privi lege 
and soc ial  strat ification.  
The Ait  'Atta customary law, referred to as azerf. was very di fferent from the shari 'a or 
Muslim jurisprudence in that it was flexible, and often carried out by expert laymen rather than 
educated and trained judges of law like the Muslim qaid. 78 Another important difference is  that 
u DAVID M. H,,RT, Origin Myths. Autoc/11honous and 'Stranger · Elements in lineage and Community Fom,ation. 
and the Question of Onomostic Recurrences in the Moroccan Rif, in TR IBE AND SOC IETY IN RURA L MOROCCO 1 3 1  
(2000) [hereinafter HART, TRJBE  AND SOCIETY] .  
7� Id. a l  2 .  " ' [A]gnatic lineage ' o r  ' patrilineage ' re fers . . .  to  t h e  largest a nd  most wide ly embracing un i l i nca l  (and 
here, patri l inea l )  descent g,oup in  which descent from a common patri lineal  or agna1ic ancestor can actua l ly  be 
traced. genealogical ly and on a step-by-step basis ,  by i ts l i ving members." Id. 
?S HART, DAOOA . ATTA, supra note 52. al 3 l .  
76 /d. a t l S . 
77 Id. 
7a l lahiane, supra note 3, at 1 22 .  See also IGNAZ GOLDZ I H ER, INTRODUCTION TO !SLAM IC THEOLOGY AND LAW 
(Andras & Ru th  H amori, trans . ,  1 98 1  ) .  
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the aze,f is  completely secu lar in nature, dealing main ly with property rights and regu l ation .  The 
majority of Berber peop les are i lliterate, however the ' Atta Jaw contains both written and oral 
elements. The oldest known written document of azerfis  written in Arabic on camel skin ,  and i s  
located in a re ligious repository with the l i neage of  Ait Mu lay Abdallah b in  Hsain, a Shurfa 
ancestor, (not an Ait 'Atta tribal member) at the old ' Atta cap ital of  lghann Amazdar in the At las 
mountains. 79 It is this intimate relationship with the Shurfa. established during the time of Dadda 
' Atta, that c reated the privi leged status of Shurfa and Ait ' Atta over the Hara tin. This al l iance 
established a dual legal system in ' Ana territory where the Shurfa establi shed control over the 
spiritua l ann of rule  whi le the Ait ' Atta retained temporal rule .80 
A major part of Berber customary law consisted of land and property. The fundamental 
tenant of ' Atta land tenure was the prohibition of fragmentation of land ownership or a l ienation 
to non-tribal members. 8 1  Land and tree tenure were the cornerstones of ' Atta customary law, and 
determined ownership, product ion,  membership,  and rights. The exclus ion of non-tribal 
members i n  this system operated to perpetuate a system of exclusive ownership and thus 
estab l ish power in the community. 82 
Various land tenure laws careful ly regu lated the qsar economies, restrict ing wealth to the 
arena of land ownership and activities that derive from its control .  For example, the ' Atta 
supervi sed the meticulous division of property among Berber fami lies a long three major 
eco logical zones in  the del icate habitat of  the oasis, maximizing the benefit  of scarce water and 
ferti le land for each household. 83 Hoarding property o f  any kind, especia lly agricu l tural products 
79 HART, OA0DA ' ATTA. supra note 52. a t  1 57 .  
80 GELLNER, supra note I 9 ,  at  1 72 .  
1 1 Ilahiane , Jupra no1e), a, 1 3 8 .  
8 2  Id. at 1 39 .  
S )  Id. a t  1 42. 
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l ike barley or dates was prohibited. 84 Other laws regulated activit ies competing wi th  land tenure 
and were forbidden . Examples of such act ivit ies were establ ishing a bakery, butcher shop, or 
sim i lar business that would compete with the div is ion of  wealth according to land . 85 These 
act i vit i es were done communa l ly  instead . This prohibi tion adversely effected the Harat in most 
of a l l  as it d i sab led another avenue for the Haratin to gain soci a l  mob i l ity and i nstead upheld the 
status quo . 
[T]he control of  economic speculation, and the customary mechanisms 
employed to b lock the entrance of market forces into the social 
organization of the v i l lage aimed at isolat ing the middleman occupat ions 
which were the only opt ions that cou ld  be mobi lized by the landless 
Haratine to economical ly  compete with the Berber landowners and 
undermine their hegemony. 86 
The a l i enation of property pre- 1 956 barred non-members from inheriting or buying ' Atta 
lands.  Speci fical ly, in  marriage, an Ait ' Atta woman who married outside the tribe cou ld not 
bring her real property into the marriage and thereby leave it to a stranger husband and chi ldren, 
rather, she received a monetary equivalent for the property she inherited and the real  property 
was remitted to her nearest male agnate. 87 This  proh ib i t ion prevented the possibi l ity  for 
a l i enat ion o f property to non-tribal members , ensuring the stasis  of property weal th .  The 
inst itut ion of sh/a 'a or "pre-empt ion" refers to the rights of  the nearest male agnati c  kinsmen to 
object to a sale of land by one of his relat i ves, or to an exogarnously arranged marriage that 
would resul t  in al ienation of property. 88 Should such an objection take place, the l and sale or the 
marri age would be prohibited . These proh ib i t ions and systems of d iv id ing property a l l  
8 4  Id .  a t  1 44 .  
s .s  Id. a t  1 43 . 
86 HsaiD J l ahiane, n1e Brenk-up of the Ksar: Changing Sefllemenr Pa1terns and Environmental ,Management in 
Southern Morouo, 48 A FR ICA TODAY 2 1 ,  32 (200 I )  [hereinafter I lahianc,  Break-up of the Ksar] . 
87 DAVID M . HART. Comparative Land Tenure and Division of /l'rigation Water in Two Moroccan Berber Societies: 
The A ith Wnryaghar of the Rif and the A it Alfa of the Saghru and South- Cen tral A tins, in TR IBE  AND SoC J t;TY. supra 
note 73 ,  at 2 1 3 . 
u Id. 
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reinforced Berber hegemony in the qsar economy and concentrated land ownership i n  the hands 
of Ait 'Atta peoples . Although the post-colonial government attempted to abol ish the operation 
of customary law, it nonetheless remains the local de/aero rule of inheritance inhibiting the 
Haratin and other non-tribal peoples attempts at purchase. 89 
Berber l aws enforced against non-tribal members usual ly occurred in the area of the 
protection relat ionship, or ra 'aya .?O The protect ion pact contained its own ru les and stipulations 
of who wou ld  police the tiggura or strip of land belonging to a Hartani, usual ly negotiated in  
exchange for portions of agricultural products.9 1  The assignment of  the  protector to  each piece 
of Hartani land took place in January and August of each year, following the transhumant 
migration patterns of the Ait ' Atta. 92 The protection pact ultimately served as a method of 
imposing 'Atta economic control by promising vulnerable sedentary communities defense 
against raiding tribes. 
Th i s  tense relationship required the supervision of the Haratin by the Ait • Atta in order to 
ensure that product ion was at its maximum. Theft from the palm groves or agricultura l  p lots was 
common, and penalti es were stri ctly en forced , especial l y  against the Haratin. Farming sancti ons 
were put into p lace to protect productivity of property. Sanct ions were enforced for act ivi t ies 
such as unauthorized taking of dates, ol ives, and other fruit ,  weeding along irrigation canals and 
rivers, collect ing green palm fronds for fuel, and wandering in the palm grove.93 The pa lm 
groves always had a chief, the amghar n 'tamazirr, who was always a Berber, and protected the 
groves from theft.� The v i l l age council, controlled by the landed Berber nobi l i ty, appointed the 
89 J lahiane. supra note 3, at 1 7 1 .  
90 HART, DADDA 'ATTA, supra note 5 2 ,  at I 1 0. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. a t  1 1 1 . 
93 I lahiane. Brenk-up of the K.tar. supra note 86. at 29 .  
� Id. 
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chief who protected Berber interests in  the property. 95 During the Protectorate era, the grove 
chiefs tasks turned i nward towards the sedentary community rather than their tradit ional post as 
guards against external thieves . They became hi red rather than appointed posi t ions and 
safeguarded the grove from the threat of thievery from inside the qsar making the Haratin a 
prime target of enforcement.96 
Should a person violate these farming codes or be found in the palm grove stealing, they 
were summoned to appear before the ajmu,  or village council who met in front of the mosque in 
an open space.97 The ajmu convened and determined a punishment , usual ly levying a fine, or 
izmaz, of a large portion of grain or other agricultural product.98 For the Haratin, th is  fi ne cou ld 
be espec ial ly  devastating as they were already very poor and sometimes incurred debt in order to 
pay the fine. 99 
In the modem context ,  customary land and tree tenure arrangements st i ll survive since 
access to land i s  dominated by the system of i nheritance that traditionally exc luded the 
Haratin. 1 00 The sharecropping system is a lso alive and wel l .  However the payment method i s  no 
l onger 1 /5 of the harvest but is more commonly a one-half system where the landlord provides 
the l and and one-ha! f of the input towards seeds and equ ipment as does the sharecropper, and 
each divide the production 50150 .  1 0 1 
While the tradit ional Ait ' Atta l aws center on land ownership and product ion, their 
crimina l laws and economic regulations also re late to the protection o f  land as the single source 
of power and status.  The secular nature of ' Atta laws is also an important feature of its function 
9S Id. 
96 Ensel ,  supra note 2. at I 72 . 
97 I lah.iane, Brenk-up of the Ksnr, supra note 86, at 29 .  
98 Id. a t  30 . 
99 Id. 
100 l lahiane. suprn note 3 ,  at I 76. 
1 0 1  Id. a t  2 1 8 . 
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as a law to rule or govern the qsar. The religious aspect of law i s  handled ent i rely by a para l lel 
i nstitution of the shari ·a , which is enforced by the religious scholars, and specia l i sts of any given 
vi l lage, usua! Jy afqih ,  1 02 belonging to the local shurfa comrnunity. 103 The shari ·a emphasizes 
equality before God and the we l l -being of the umma, or community of believers . The ' Atta laws, 
secu lar in nature, are separated from this religious ethos, and so permitts a legal system that 
promotes exclusivity and inequal ity. 
C. Traditional Governance 
Although the Haratin physical ly occupied the qsar and worked its fields ,  they were 
nonetheless excluded from participating in the legal structure that ran it. As quasi-contracted 
· l abor, they were under the conditions of the Berber customary legal tradit ion, occupying the 
Berber legal space, yet not given agency within i t .  The A.it ' Atta tribe preferred to exclude 
outsiders in order to maintain their dom inance of  sedentary communi t ies. 
The quintessential form of rule in the qsar was the ajmu,  or local village council . 
Tradit iona l ly, the ajmu consisted of Berber elders in the qsar and prohibited participat ion by 
Shurfa and Harat in a l ike .  The Shurfa maintained a paral lel  power structure as qaids or rel igious 
leaders and arbitrators . They functioned solely in  the areas where the shari ·a ruled and so 
l im i ted themselves to trus type of authority. The vi l lage counci l original ly retained the authority 
to parcel out property, manage i t ,  regulate trade, arbitrate various land disputes, and pun ish 
th ieves. 1 04  Their focus on the management  of the vi l l age ' s  economic and cultural li fe advocated 
preservation of Atta people  and their supremacy, leavi ng outsiders with violence and other fonns 
10� Ensel, supra note 2 ,  at 250.  He defi.nes/qil, as a leader of prayers aod/or teacher of  the Qur' an .  
1 03 Id. at 1 24 . 
io- 1 lahianc, supra note 3, at 1 26-27 .  
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of resistance as the only outlet of their concerns due to their l ack of  representat ion i n  this 
council. 1 05 
The ajmu also arbitrated land disputes, however, when a local vi l lage had a d i spute that 
could not be solved or resulted in a deadlock, the vi l lage coW1ci] could  refer the case to the ' Atta 
capital for resolution . 1 06 Before the French protectorate era, the Ait 'Atta Supreme Court heard 
such di sputes and convened outdoors ,  however during the French occupat ion , it was re-located to 
a small one room school house bu i lt at the site in 1 938 called the Jszinaf 1 07 The local counci ls 
also followed th.is tradit ional venue of hearing cases outdoors , in particular, in front of the local 
mosque. 1 08 The procedure consisted of summons and ci tation of  offense, followed by 
deliberation of the counciI . 1 09 
At the h ighest level, the super-tribal or Confederate ajmu convened at the traditional 
' Atta capi tal of lgharm Amazdar. 1 1 0 Each sub tribe was represented at this council and they 
e lected the super-tribal chief of the Ait ' Ana every year. The guiding principles of election were 
that of rotat ion and complementarity. Rotat ion of the chief was annua l  and complementarity was 
reflected in e lection el igibility, as the candidates for office d id  not have a vote in the election for 
cruef. 1 1 1  The rights and duties of this top chief, who presided over the entire A.it ' Atta 
Confederacy had preeminence in any decision . This included responsibi l i ty for defense of the 
territory, regulat ion of relat ions with outsiders, and declarat ion of war. 1 1 2 The village ajmu 
fol lowed this same model of election . In both cases, the chief was subject to d isposal if he were 
perceived as unsuccessful in terms of a plenti fu l  harvest, or there were some great calamity that 
10s Id. 
106 HART, D A DDA · ATTA , supra note 52 .  at 1 67 .  
107 Id. at 29. 
i os I lahiane, supra cote 3 ,  at 1 34 .  ' °" Id. 
1 10 HART, DA DDA · Arri\, supra note 52,  at 20. 
1 1 1  Id. at 76- 77 .  
1 1 2 Id. at 79. 
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marked his term . 1 1 3  Despite the egal itarianism expressed in this form o f  leadership, i t  exp l ic i t ly 
excluded non-tribal  members, creating a deep fissure between the conquered and the ruling 
classes . 
UI. Haratin Resis tance and Redefinition 
With.in this framework of Ait 'Atta Jaws control l ing the economic relationship with the 
Haratin,  a separate system of authentic Hartan.i jurisprudence i s  di fficult to locate, especial ly i f  
we rely on Eurocentric models of law. 1 1 4 While no formal system of  Haratin codes and laws 
exists ,  res i stance to Ait ' Atta laws in the forms of breaking the laws, especially stealing, and 
circumventing l aws, as well as seeking law in the form of indigenous knowledge, all provide 
spaces where i t  is possible to exp lore and ident ify expressions of  Haratin law and order. 
Resistance to the ' Atta imperial  relationship i s  largely evident through the frequent 
Harat in  citat ions for steal ing from the palm grove. 1 1 5 Criminal enforcement of non-tribal  
members focused primari ly on theft .  Confinement of the Harat in to sharecropping tasks and low 
compensat ion for their work fed i nto the frequency of theft .  Under the pre- 1 956  system, the 
Harat in  were exc luded from the local counci ls altogether. Today, the Harat in are able to 
participate in  the counc i l  due to thei r presence in  the oasis as landowners, empowering them wi th 
the right to hold such o ffices . 1 1 6 Instead of  being subject to the mercy o f  an a l l •Berber ajmu, the 
Haratin are now able to protect their own from al legations o f  theft ,  and are able to intervene 
I l l Id. 
1 1 4 MARIE BATTISTE & JAMES (SA 'KE'J)  YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, PROTECTING IND IGENOUS KNOWLEOGE AND 
HERITAGE, A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 22.23 ( 2000) .  ''The core of Eurocenrric thought is its c laim to be universal . . .  
Eurocentric intellectuals have abandoned anc ient truths, values, and ways o f  l i fe, and ha ve accepted Eurocennism as 
their measure of progress . " Baniste is M i ' kmaq from Unama ' k ik in Canada, and is a professor in the Indian and 
Northern Educat ion Program at the Univers i t y  of Saskatc hewan. Her work focuses on the protect ion of indigenous 
heritage. Henderson. a Chickasaw from Oklahoma is a member of the Uni versity of Saskatchewan ·s Col lege of 
Law and performs scholarship around issues of  Nat ive peoples and American and Canadian jurisprudence. 
1 1 5  I lahiane, supra no te 3 ,  a t  332 .  
1 16 Hsain l lahiane, The Social Mobi/iry of the Hnratine and th e Re- Working of 8011rdieus Hubitus on the Sohara11 
Frontier. Mt>rocco, 1 03(2) AMER ICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 3 80, 387 ( 200 1 )  [here inafter l lahiane ,  Social Mobiliry] . 
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when fines are levied . 1 1 7 This power has not gone unnoticed by the declin ing nobi l ity who are 
quick to condemn the social mob i l i ty of the Haratin peop le  as an erosion of law into comp lete 
chaos and anarchy. 1 1 s 
The most obvious change in the oasis communities in terms of law and order is the 
presence of the Haratin as a land owning class .  The colonia l  period in Morocco presented many 
pe-0ple with unforeseen opportunities to migrate in search of seasonal work in the cities of 
Morocco, Algeria, and eventually Europe. 1 1 9  The exploi tative labor conditions that the Harat in 
were exposed to in the qsar made work out side of it attract ive. Obtaining work for wages rather 
than a share of crops empowered the Haratin with a method of circumventing the old tradi t ional 
methods of exclusion and oppression. The Harat in  employed the strategy of purchasing lands 
they had worked for many years with the monies earned in cities . 1 20 The conversion of wages 
into land acqu isi t ion served as the primary mode of subversion of the trad i ti onal exclusionary 
system of ' Atta law and governance . 
The impact of  land acquisition for the Haratin has resul ted in their election to v i l lage 
counci l s  and the commencement o f  obtai ning full  membership  in the community. 1 2 1 
Representat ion of  the Hara t in in  these councils has altered the ethno-pol it ical structure of  the 
oasis 1 22 and has faci l i tated the visib i l i ty of the Haratin in thei r respect ive communit ies as 
empowered ci tizens rather than marginal ized actors in a feudal economy. "[n essence, these 
economic and po l i tical changes have prompted the mob i l izati on  of latent ethnic consciousness 
and the creat ion of trad i t ion among the Haratin . " 1 23 This trad it ion is rooted in the abi l i ty to 
l l i  Id. 
1 > s /d. 
1 I 9 /d. at 383 .  
120 l lahiane, supra note 3 ,  at 264. 
1 2 1 Id. at 3 1 8 .  
1 12 Td. at 3 1 9 . 
1 23 Id. a t  320 .  
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purchase and own real property. The Haratin have taken this privilege and have fashioned thei r  
own institut ions o f  land use an d  ownership, expressions o f  their �erging jurisprudence in th i s  
area of law .  
Mutual aid among the Haratin i s  expressed in  the institut ion of  rwiza, a system of  
sharecropping that is  complete ly run and operated by fel low Haratin, providing ass istance to  
others who are unable to complete agricultural tasks on  their own . 1 24 Other aid efforts have been 
estab l ished in the form of a col lect i ve fund for burial ceremonies that are d i stributed to those in  
need who may not be  ab le to  afford the  traditional expenses associated wi th burial rights such as 
the feast, grave digging, and rel igious ceremony. 1 2 5 The Hartani mutual aid i nstitutions of  
assisted labor and burial funds contrasts with the Ait ' Atta perception of  l and and wealth. While  
the Berbers a im a t  keeping land as exclusive as possible, the Hartani emphasize communal 
benefit of individual ly purchased p lots . The Haratin ensure their survival as a community by 
financial ly supporting one another in  this way. 
A l though the Harat in were excluded from owning land pre- 1 956,  thei r unique connect ion 
with the land in  the capacity of agricul tural  specia l i sts and irrigation d i tch d iggers provided them 
an advantage in terms of their product ion of these lands, and in  tum, their abi l i ty to maximize the 
production yield of these smal l  p lots testi fying to thei r "intimate ecologjcal knowledge' ' o f  the 
oasis, giving them an advantage over Arab and Berber landowners. 1 26 The Harat in ' s  tradi t i onal 
knowledge about their environment and methods of  fanning have proved to be p rofitable as their 
high yields feed their communit ies and keep production at a maximum. The ru les and trad i t ions 
1 2' I</ at 295.  
1 25  Id. at  320. 
1 2& I lahianc. supra note 3 .  at 290. 
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employed in farming on Harat in owned p lots reflects an aspect of their lega l system 1 2 7 simi lar to 
the way the Ai t 'Atta regulations of farming reflected their values of land tenure . However, 
un like the Berber, the Haratin actual ly worked these fields and cultivated them for centuries. 
While the Berber land tenure system focused on production and h i gh yield in order to benefit the 
Berber landowners to the detriment of the workers, the Haratin use their extensive knowledge of 
fanning in order to assi st one another i n  the community. 
Stories of  Hartani oppression as field l aborers indicate the consciousness of the biased 
and unfair system of sharecropping. One Haratin testimony indicates the harsh work ing 
condit ions of h is peop le and the reality of what i t  meant to be paid in  kind. 
I remember with v ividness, just as i f  it happened yesterday . . .  during one 
o f  the major floods of early fall  and late winter . . .  the guard of the 
irrigat ion system made us work almost naked, and the on ly thing we ate 
was a p iece of bread tucked under or around our waists : your hands 
worked, your back was bent, and your forehead sweated as you l abored in 
five-meter deep irrigation canals from the rising star to the evening star. 1 28 
The triple  oppression of the Harat in under the Arab,  Berber, and French - who are seen as 
conspirators of the nob i lity, are marked with bitterness and trauma o f  end l ess years of  unfair  and 
cruel labor condi t i ons. 1 29 The Haratin model of sharecropping for other Harat i n ,  the twiza, flows 
from this experience and fashioned the l abor relat i onsh ip as one of mutual aid rather than 
exploitation. Labor pol icies ,  an aspect of  Haratin customary law is based on a col lective 
experience and h istory as sharecroppers and workers in other low-wage sectors . Memories and 
stories serve as the guiding pol icy of Hara t in commun i ties in thei r development of their own 
m BATTISTE. & YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, supra note 1 1 4 ,  at 43-45 .  "The trad i t ional ecological knowledge o f  
Indigenous peoples is scien t ific .  in  the sense that i t  i s  empir ica l ,  experimental ,  and systemat ic .  I t  d iffers in rwo 
imponant respec ts  from Western sc ience, bowever: trad i t iona l  ecological knowledge is highly localized and i t  is 
social . Its focus is the web of rela t i onships between humans, animals, p lants, natural  forces, spirits ,  and the land 
forms in a panicu la r  locality, as opposed to  the d i scovery of uni versal " l aws."" Id. a t  44 .  
1 2 8 l l ah.iane, Social Mobility, suprn note 1 1 6, at 389. 
1 29 Id. 
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unique system o f  labor. While labor defined class and ethnic identi fication under the pre- 1 956  
period, the Haratin are evo lv ing away from these explo itat ive methods towards an equitab l e  
model that fosters mutual aid, ass i stance, and fair working conditions . 
Despite the i ncreased v isibi l i ty and agency the Haratin have gained in their communi t i es, 
they are sti l l  a part of small rural communities whose balance of power i s  tied to land ownership 
and labor, and can easi ly be manipulated by either majority. The interdependency of the 
different ethnic groups upon one another - the Haratin upon the Berber and Arab landowners for 
labor, and the landowners upon the laborers to plant. tend, and pick produce - remains a strong 
field of influence in t imes of  rapid social change. For example, one town's  elections that 
resul ted in a Hartani winning a seat to the rural parliamentary counci l and subsequent boasting 
by many Haratin in the street led to a boycott ofHarat in  labor, leaving many people  without 
work and a means to survive. 1 30 In response, the Haratin performed the dabiha ritual, sacri ficing 
a sheep to the Berber elders, signifying thei r  submi ttal to their authority. The stubborn survival 
of th i s  formal ritual was employed in order to reconfigure the power structure of the vi l lage . 
Moreover, the actua l boycott of Hartani labor indicates the types of  modem economic coerc ion 
that the Haratin are subject too, disab l ing their advancement towards a more autonomous way of 
l i fe. 
IV. Conclusion 
The suppression of  Harat in  people' s  abi l i ty to (re)acqu ire l and has severely  inhibi ted the 
vis ibi l ity of Haratin jurisprudence, i dentity and sel f.determinat ion . Western not ions of  
Do Id. at 390.  After the election of a Hararine candidate to the prov incia l par l iament, the  local Berber men and 
women decided to boycon Hartani labor. " [T]he Haratine sharecroppers found tbe mse lves unemployed overnight, 
and rheir labor arrangements were e l iminated. Furthermore, when the Harat ine were encouniered throughout the 
pa l m  grove, they were questioned as to the reasons that brought them to that part of the grove, and they were 
reminded that the fie lds  and trees that had been feeding them for ge nera t ion were not t be property o f  the Haratine 
cand idate they supported."  Id. 
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indigenous self-determination are rooted in a tribe 's  physical occupation and control or domin ion 
over a territory and its people. The relationship  between land and sel f-determination is  revealing 
in that it is the control of al i enation and exploi tation of land that can produce a visible lega l 
structure for peoples tied to that l and .  Because of the landlessness of the Harat in people and 
their oppression by another ind i genous group, the visib i l ity of Haratin laws is minimal and 
difficul t  to assess in comparison with the formal structure provided by the Ait ' Att a .  
Another cause of  invisibi lity may be the  operation and location of custom that i s  
'i,resumed to be an expression of the people's wi l l, forged in the crucible of dai ly living . . _ , ,
u i 
Daily living may suppress the expression of legal traditions under a cloak of the mundane 
masking a community 's  ethics, standards, and expectations of behavioral conformity (manners) . 
These customs "describe a legal situation" 1 32 as demonstrated by Hartani inst itutions such as 
twiza, and communal funds. As an unwritten law, these customs form the legal tradition o f the 
Haratin and maintai n the potential for change, flex i bility, and adjustment. 
As an outsider examin ing the jurisprudence of a culture through the anthropological 
works of European authors, sociological and h i storical tex ts by Moroccans, and no l i terature by  
Haratin peop le themselves, I must recognize my l imited abili t ies to  fully underst and or  grasp 
Haratin laws and customs. Instead of presenting a complete picture of Hartani j urisprudence, I 
present a problem o f  understanding and recognizing indigenous legal systems where a group 
falls outside of the norm. Moreover, the Harat in provide an example of why de-centering studies 
of tribal j urisprudence from North America i s  imperat ive for some i ndigenous groups seeking to 
l ) I  LEON SHELEFF, THE FuruR.E OF TRADITION , CUSTOMAR.V LAW, COMMON LAW AND LEGAL PLURALISM 377 
( 2000). Shclc ff. original ly from Sou1h Africa and now at chc Un i vers i ty of Te l-Av iv, serves as a lega l professor in 
the area of soc io logy of l aws and lega l sys1cms. 
I J l Id. 
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assert their ri ghts in their own lands, or to liberate themselves from other oppressive regimes 
who may at t imes be other tribal government actors. 
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Glossary 
Ait 'Atta - A Berber tribe in southern Morocco 
Ajmu - An ' Atta word for the local village corn1cil that is the most local form of ' Atta 
governance 
Azerf - Ait ' Atta customary law 
Baraka - an Islamic concept of divine blessing 
Haratine - (singular Hartani), group of indigenous people to southern Morocco 
Ismkhan - descendants of freed slaves 
Izmaz - fine levied against a thief by the village corn1cil, or ajmu 
Murabitin - descendants of local Arab saints 
Osar - an adobe walled settlement that encloses a vi llage and its agricultural fields 
Ra'aya - the protect ion pact entered into between the 'Atta and qsar residents 
Shari 'a  - Islamic law 
Shfa'a - the ' Atta concept of  preempt ion that gives the right to the nearest ma le  relat i ve of a 
landowner who i s  sel l ing property, to obj ect to the sale 
Shurfa - an elite class of landowning descendants of the Arab Moroccan dynasty, al so related to 
the Prophet Muhammad. 
Tigurra - a strip of arable  land,. usually belonging to a Hartani 
Twiza - Haratine system of communal mutual aid 
Outline of Governing Structures of the Oasis 1 
Ait 'Atta azeef structure : 
Sub-tribe Sub�tribe Sub-tribe Sub-tribe Sub-tribe 
+ + + + + 
Clans & Clans & Clans & Clans& Clans& 
Lineages Lineages Lineages Lineages Lineages 
Ajmu 
Local Vi l lage Counci l  
'Atta members only 
Haratine excluded 
Shari ' a  Structure :  
Re l igious Legal Issue _____. Shur fa rel igious judge 
(Divorce, Adultery, etc) 
� Dispute 
1 Note that these structures are the trad it iona l  structures found during the pre- I ndependence per iod of Morocco . The 
secu lar legal system of Morocco, that also has a shari 'a component rep l aces much of the old azerfsysrem ,  
nonetheless, these t rad it ional govern ing systems st i l l  operate primarily through t h e  loca l  v i l lage counc i l s  who  are 
now elected. The counc i l  members s t i l l  consist however, of land owners ,  thus margina l i z ing Hara t i ne  
representat ion. 
2 httpJ/www . i nfoplease .com/a t l as/countrv/morocco.htm l  
